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The notion that “relief alone is not enough” is common to all actors involved in humanitarian 
crises and their management. This notion was officially framed at the United Nations (UN) in 
1991 as a “continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development” and today remains a 
challenging task in the agenda of international assistance. Despite periodic efforts to understand 
the problem and to put forward solutions, reviews report a lack of conceptual clarity and little 
progress. We suggest that one of the reasons is the paucity of efforts to clarify the meaning of 
the continuum in a way that leads to an understanding that covers crisis-specific settings as well 
as humanitarian crises in general. Thus, the present paper aims to contribute to advancing this 
conceptual front by comparing general approaches to the continuum of humanitarian crisis 
management with those that can be found through the work on two emblematic types of crises: 
disaster risk reduction and peacebuilding. We show that parallel understandings of the 
continuum as a matter of actors and as a matter of phases coexist and are in need of 
disambiguation; there is difficulty internalizing the non-linearity of the process and a lack of 
clarity on the position of prevention within humanitarian crisis management. We put forward a 
multi-layered activities model as the most basic understanding of the continuum to which all 
actors can converge, and describe its strengths and weaknesses. Local ownership is the most 
important limiting factor, and the alternative to realizing the continuum of pursuing approaches 
internal to or among foreign actors is not a substitute.   
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1. Introduction 
The notion that “relief alone is not enough” is common to all actors involved in 
humanitarian crises and their management. The United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 46/182 of 1991“ Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian 
emergency assistance of the United Nations”, the Magna Carta of today’s 
humanitarian activity (Oshima 2004), makes clear that prevention is to be pursued as 
much as possible to reduce the impact of crises, and asserts that once a crisis occurs, 
“a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development” is the ideal goal 
(UN 1991). This ideal underlying humanitarian crisis management was framed in the 
resolution as “the continuum” between phases and among partners, and since then the 
continuum has been one of the most recurrent issues in the discussion of humanitarian 
affairs (Smillie 1998). Yet, despite much talk, recent reviews on the topic show there 
is no conceptual agreement on what realizing the continuum actually means (e.g., 
Steets 2011; Otto 2013), and include generally negative reports about progress in 
practice. The continuum is important not only because of the possible gains in 
efficiency, but also because aid that fails to recognize the dynamics of the crisis can 
actually harm these already embattled populations. For instance, free provision of 
goods and services can destroy the jobs of local actors who actually provide those 
things during normal times. Unmanaged recovery may interfere with the plans for 
building back better, making societies less resilient. Recognizing and acting within 
the continuum throughout humanitarian crisis management is a human security 
challenge that deserves more attention (See Tanaka 2015; Kamidohzono et al. 2016).  
This paper aims to advance the discussion about realizing the 
continuum—both understanding the underlying problems and striving to address 
them—on the conceptual front. Without clarity about what the problem is, the many 
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different actors involved in humanitarian crisis management would struggle to 
communicate about their goals, hindering joint action. Our starting point is the 
following observation: while there has been relatively much attention paid to the 
problem of realizing the continuum in general, there have been few attempts to 
systematically link these general discussions to accounts of realizing the continuum 
after specific types of crises; but since many of the actors and activities that are 
expected to converge to this aim are not general but specific to each type of crises, 
the lack of such connections seems to be a major weakness. Therefore, in the 
following pages we compare general conceptualizations with crisis-specific 
approaches for disasters triggered by natural hazards and armed conflicts, perhaps the 
two more emblematic types of crises. In the next section, we set the framework for 
the comparison following the initial UN resolution and offer general background 
about the types of approaches to the continuum that we cover. Next, each of the three 
major groups—i.e., general approaches to humanitarian crises as a whole, and two 
specific approaches to natural disaster and armed conflict —are explained 
individually. In the final section, we discuss them in tandem, putting forward the 
basis for a general model of the continuum, as well as recognizing the limits of such 
an effort.  
Before moving on, a couple of clarifications are necessary. First, it should be 
clear that by sticking to the original framing of the problem as the continuum, we are 
not favoring any single approach or specific policy. We use the word “continuum” as 
a neutral, analytical concept to describe the problem in order to allow comparisons 
across different policies and approaches. During the nineties, the word “continuum” 
was seen as an approach to the problem that emphasized a linear sequence of phases 
and actors, which was strongly criticized for its inaccuracy (e.g., DHA 1995). This 
explains its early disappearance from some organizations’ parlance, such as UN 
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Development Programme (UNDP) (Smilllie 1998, XXIII) and the European 
Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO). This view still can be 
heard (e.g., Macrae 2012), especially in the presentation of new approaches, but no 
alternative has been agreed to describe the problem. Other candidates have important 
limitations: the term “contiguum” has received little attention beyond its European 
proponents and it is not properly a word; the “gap” is too generic and it is historically 
too close to the work of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Crisp 
2001); the “humanitarian-development divide” is an appealing name but it conceals 
what may be in fact part of the problem—i.e., for those affected by crisis, the 
difference between humanitarian and developmental aid makes no sense (OCHA and 
DARA 2014). Mindful of the criticisms and ready to reflect them through the analysis, 
the continuum still seems an attractive option to describe the problem. 
Second, in this paper, realizing the continuum is presented as the heart of 
crisis management, by which we understand the comprehensive effort of the 
international community to deal with humanitarian emergencies. This understanding 
is not central to the scholarship on crisis management (e.g., Boin et al. 2008) but 
through the process leading up to the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 it has been 
put forth as an umbrella concept that tries to align at the national level mandates that 
sometimes work in silos at the international level: humanitarian relief, peacebuilding, 
disaster risk reduction, development and climate change.1 Therefore, management 
implies attention to the different phases of a crisis, and thus our research is not 
limited to relief only. Multiple phases and actors reflect the dynamic change of needs 
throughout a crisis and its aftermath, requiring both short-term and long-term 
commitments to achieve the final goal of securing humans. “Management” is 
1 The European Union External Action does recognize, at least in principle, the full picture 
of the continuum as part of crisis management. See Tercovich (2014) and the website of the 
European Union External Action on Crisis Management: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis_management/index_en.htm (accessed on October 13, 2015). 
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preferred over merely assistance and aid because the term reflects the changing nature 
of the global commitment, suggesting there is a (proto) system covering all phases of 
crisis as well as the multiplicity of actors involved.  
Lastly, while conceptual in spirit, the present research is also the result of a 
series of 50 semi-structured interviews held with different stakeholders involved in 
crisis management. Two rounds of face-to-face interviews were held in February and 
May–June 2015 at headquarters in Brussels, Geneva, London, New York, and 
Washington D.C., besides Tokyo, plus other complementary videoconferences, 
consultations, and interviews. Interviewees included bilateral agencies, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics and practitioners 
who work in single mandate or multi-mandate organizations and who have experience 
in the approaches covered by the report. Insights from several events during the 2015 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and on the preparations for the World 
Humanitarian Summit also provided important input to the research. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 A frame for comparison 
The UN Resolution 46/182 presented the ideal of the continuum as an essential goal 
for the emerging humanitarian system in general. The resolution was not the first time 
such a vision was put forward (e.g., Kent 1983; McAllister 1993; Barnett 2011), but it 
is a widely recognized landmark in global humanitarian affairs that offers an 
appropriate starting point. The resolution gave way to the emergence and 
consolidation of humanitarian affairs through the UN system, as well as among 
donors, who created specific divisions to deal with humanitarian affairs in the 
following years (Borton 1993). For instance, in 1992 the Bureau for Humanitarian 
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Response (now Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, DCHA) was 
created by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Olson 
2005); ECHO was created in 1992; the United Kingdom Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA, now Department for International Development, DFID) 
modified its structure to cover relief assistance shortly after the UN resolution; and in 
April 1992, the International Emergency Relief Division was created in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
In terms of funding, in 1988 humanitarian aid only accounted to less than 2% 
of the Official Development Assistance (ODA), in 1991 it reached 6% (Borton 1993), 
and since the end of the nineties it has stabilized at around 10% (Development 
Initiatives 2013); that represents moving from less than a billion US dollars in the 
late eighties to a total of 18.7 billion US dollars from governments out of the full 
budget of 24.5 billion in 2014 (Development Initiatives 2015). Growing humanitarian 
needs and availability of resources resulted in a constellation of actors getting 
involved, including NGOs, militaries, private companies, and academics, all of whom 
now take part in the thriving humanitarian business (Weiss 2013). The main goal of 
the 1991 resolution was to coordinate this system, a herculean task in itself that is 
still very much in progress more than two decades later. Realizing the continuum was 
an aspirational, follow-up priority.  
In this sense, the resolution is ambiguous in its description of the continuum: 
in some sections it is presented as a matter of phases and in others as a matter of 
actors. Regarding the former, the resolution emphasizes the importance of prevention 
and preparedness, explaining that economic growth and development are essential for 
this purpose. Then, once a crisis occurs, the continuum implies “a smooth transition 
from relief to rehabilitation and development.” (UN 1991) In other sections, it also 
refers to “reconstruction” and “recovery,” evidence of the multiplicity of similar 
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concepts ensuing from a lack of general agreement. Regarding actors, the resolution 
distinguishes between development assistance organizations and “those responsible 
for emergency and recovery,” who are expected to collaborate. The resolution warns 
against contributions to humanitarian assistance affecting existing contributions to 
international cooperation for development.  
This ambiguity regarding the crux of the continuum entails offers an appealing 
frame to compare existing approaches. While the two components overlap and are 
necessary in practice, they represent different takes on what the problem is. Realizing 
the continuum in terms of phases suggests the problem is devising the strategy for 
undertaking different types of necessary activities after crisis in a timely manner. On 
the other hand, describing the problem in terms of actors implies coordination is the 
main hurdle either preventing or promoting the realization of the continuum. If we 
take strategy to be the major concern, it is secondary who provides the activities as 
long as needs are adequately covered. On the other hand, coordination assumes that 
actors and their mandates are fixed, so success is mainly a matter of joint efforts. 
Comparing the weight given to either phases or actors in approaches to the continuum 
during the last quarter century will help elucidate commonalities and discrepancies 
between approaches. 
Finally, there is an additional factor that deserves special mention: funding. 
How money flows during the management of a crisis greatly influences the kinds of 
problems that are relevant for realizing the continuum. Does it help to connect 
phases? Or does it help to connect actors? Both? Neither? For instance, the resolution 
established contingency funding dedicated to emergencies only, so it hindered from 
the very beginning transforming relief money into recovery money. Observe how 
Steets (2011), in her analysis of the continuum/contiguum, argues for distinguishing 
the disconnect between humanitarian and development assistance from the funding 
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gap, as two issues deserving separate treatment. While we consider the two to be 
close enough to make overall suggestions, we take her point and include funding as an 
additional parameter for comparison.  
 
2.2 Different approaches to the continuum  
We identify two types of approaches to realizing the continuum: general approaches 
covering any type of crisis and specific approaches to particular types of crises. In the 
following sections we will concentrate on their characteristics, and here will 
introduce them and describe the context from which they originated.  
General approaches are direct follow-ups of the 1991 resolution, usually 
linked to actors and/or activities related to humanitarian mandates. Among existing 
approaches, we focus on the following: 
 
 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) (European Commission 
(EC) 1996) is perhaps the longest standing example. Suggested in the European 
Union, there have been two EC communications devoted to it (1996; 2001) and it 
was later part of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (EC 2007); LRRD 
is usually associated with ECHO, although ideally it was to involve also the 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) 
for development,2 and even the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
charge of foreign and security policy. The implementation of LRRD still today 
receives attention, as recent reviews (Otto 2013; Mosel and Levine 2014) and 
reports (Morazan et al. 2012; ADE and Humanitarian Futures Programme 2014) 
suggest; nonetheless, the resilience agenda seems due to displace it.  
2 The Fragility and Resilience Unit was created in 2013 inside DEVCO partly to be in charge 
of LRRD.  
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 Relief to Development, as recommended in the report of the Inter-Agency Team 
on Rapid Transitions from Relief to Development (1996), was an early approach 
of the USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the U.S. 
government, which lately has also endorsed resilience.3    
 Early Recovery is the most concrete example of a general approach to realize the 
continuum through the UN system. Early recovery started as one of several 
clusters of action in the so-called Cluster System, but little by little it has become 
a crosscutting approach (IASC 2012).   
 Seamless assistance is one of the main strategies of Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), “that spans everything from prevention of conflict 
and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict or disaster, assistance 
for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term development assistance.”4 It can be 
considered an expansion of UNHCR work on the “gap” concept (Kamidohzono et 
al. 2015).   
 Resilience is an emergent concept equally embraced by USAID (2012), DFID 
(2011) and the EU institutions (EC 2012; 2013; 2015). The definition is mostly 
common, referring to “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, 
and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a 
manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth” 
(USAID 2012). Resilience is still considered experimental but has gained much 
traction through the UN system—including the World Bank.  
 
3 The U.S. government commitment to the continuum is longstanding. The Office of US 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was created in 1964 as part of USAID in charge of 
initial relief, which in the seventies and eighties was broadened to disaster assistance, 
implying prevention/preparedness as well as recovery and rehabilitation (Olson 2005). 
However, these efforts to realize the continuum have not been crystalized on a single 
approach, but instead several bureaus in different departments play roles (Yoshikawa 2013, 
11). This report is an exception. 
4 From JICA’s home page: http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/mission/index.html 
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On the other hand, we focus on two types of humanitarian crises: disasters 
triggered by natural hazards—natural disasters for short—and armed conflict. These 
two cover a good range of the global attention on emergencies, particularly since 
pandemics, slow-onset emergencies like drought, and even technological risks have 
been linked to the “natural” disasters agenda.5  
In the case of natural disasters, we focus on the progress on global agreement 
through the outcomes of World Conferences on Disaster Risk Reduction starting in 
Yokohama in 1994, followed by Kobe in 2005, and then Sendai in 2015, all in Japan. 
The conferences originated from the process to mainstream action against disasters 
through the UN beginning with the International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction in the nineties. Their outcomes have become a global referent on this 
specific type of crisis.  
 
Figure 1. Overlapping intervention models between peace and conflict 
 
Sources: OECD 2010, 2; Bailey et al. 2009, 8. Some modifications added by the authors.  
5 That was the case during 2015 World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, 
Japan. Still, we focus on rapid-onset emergencies.  
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In the case of armed conflict, coming up with the right model to describe the 
continuum is a major difficulty. Figure 1 describes eight different intervention models 
in transition between conflict and peace (OECD 2010; Bailey et al. 2009). Two of 
them—counter insurgency and counter terrorism—are primarily security-oriented, 
and so are not of relevant for our purposes. Stabilization normally includes rapid 
reaction and military activities, but it also can include humanitarian assistance, 
recovery, and development activities (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014; Collinson et al. 
2010, 3). State-building is recognized as an essential aid objective for fragile states in 
transition but remains less concerned with relief and, instead, could be seen as part of 
peacebuilding; the opposite can be said of early recovery, emerging from relief 
activities but also becoming part of peacebuilding. Thus, peacebuilding seems to be 
the most promising model to examine as an approach for the continuum after armed 
conflict. 
 
3 General approaches to the continuum 
3.1 Phases and strategy 
In Table 1, we present a summary of the main characteristics of general approaches. 
We include a row summarizing the main issues/aims highlighted by each of the 
approaches.  
The first row of the table gathers the phases included on each of the 
approaches reviewed. Most of the approaches usually start from relief, humanitarian 
phase, or emergency, which are used interchangeably, and then connect to 
development. So, as far as it can be seen from the viewpoint of phases, it is difficult 
to distinguish whether activities or actors with fixed mandates are emphasized. 
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Relief and development are common for at least four approaches except 
Resilience, but in between these two different terms—i.e., rehabilitation, emergency, 
prevention, prompt recovery—are included in two of the five approaches.6 While the 
term rehabilitation is used, its meaning is not well-understood (Rebelle 1999, 36; 
Steets 2011), and instead recovery has become a more standard word for this phase. 
UNDP early recovery policy (2008) stresses that early recovery is not a stage in the 
continuum, though the seamless approach and others present it as such (Steets 2011).  
Regarding phases, the most interesting feature is the way Resilience makes 
less emphasis on distinguishing them. Definitions of resilience do include an overall 
idea of different activities, for instance when the terms “mitigate, adapt to and 
recover” appear in the USAID case. However, the essence of the approach is defined 
by the efforts taken to avoid the identification of phases. A key message, which 
originates on the LRRD and is reaffirmed in the proposition of Resilience, is that all 
6 Graphic depictions of early recovery show preparedness and recovery as other phases, but 
the explanation does not provide further detail (UNDP 2008).  
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activities occur in parallel. A commitment to resilience pursues contiguous 
participation during the entire crisis. Moreover, it is worth observing that prevention 
is not conceived as a phase in these propositions, but rather as something to be 
internalized in humanitarian and developmental action. To be clear: there is no lack of 
support for preparedness and prevention, but it is not conceived as a phase in the 
process.  
Specific issues proposed by the different approaches aim to address the 
connections between phases. Most directly, timing in the sense of sequencing types of 
aid suggests a division of labor that has to be addressed. Concern for the selection of 
implementing partners, in as much as they are capable in practice to deliver different 
kinds of activities, also relates to the transition between phases. This has been 
especially relevant for LRRD, in which exit strategies and sharing or not partners 
with DEVCO have been issues of concern (Koddenbrock and Buttner 2009). 
Indirectly, it could be said that calls for local responsibility and governance also 
relate to phases, given that local actors are the ones expected to remain during the full 
process.  
 
3.2 Actors and coordination 
Seen from the viewpoint of their origin, approaches tend not to go beyond the 
organizations that propose them. LRRD is mostly about connecting ECHO with 
DEVCO, whereas Developmental Relief and the Seamless approach focus on 
connecting projects and programs internal to the country and their 
organizations—across U.S. agencies, including USAID/OFDA, and inside Japan. The 
Resilience approach, as presented by the EU, and by other bilateral agencies and 
NGOs, has tried to go beyond donor-centric action, and the EU compendium of 
activities showcases progress (EC 2015). Large initiatives that are still ongoing have 
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been tested on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Yet, tools presented as joint planning 
cells (USAID), Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework (JHDF) methodologies 
(ECHO-DEVCO), 7  and Multi-hazard Disaster Risk Assessments (DFID) suggest 
internal practices are the main engine for action.  
Underlying the Resilience approach’s lack of emphasis on phases is the push 
for deeper and more meaningful coordination. This concern for coordination is 
common to most of the approaches, which is highlighted in the extent to which the 
terms “humanitarian” and “development” refer not to phases but actors. Now and 
twenty years ago, making different kinds of organizations sit down and work together 
has been difficult. In the case of the U.S., the fact that the Secretary of State is in 
charge of refugee situations, that the Department of Defense also plays a distinct role 
and commands an independent budget, and that over twenty government offices or 
more are also involved in assistance makes coordination even more complex 
(Koddenbrock and Buttner 2009). Morazan et al. (2012, 21) observe that “what has 
been missing... is the political will to understand and support these complex dynamics 
of crisis resolution and LRRD in a meaningful manner.” According to several 
interviewees, Resilience aims to gather such political will.  
Issues included on Table 1 and tools described above evidence efforts to get 
everyone on the same page, at least in terms of understanding each crisis situation. 
Difficulties ensuing from different planning and funding cycles are the target of these 
tools, but ulterior problems are also pointed out. As an evaluation of the 
implementation of the European consensus on humanitarian aid (ADE and 
Humanitarian Futures Programme 2014, 90) observes, “[H]umanitarian aid strives to 
remain independent, while development aid seeks to align with recipient 
governments.” The evaluation suggests that all along the very issue of getting 
7 At the field level it works between ECHO and the EU delegation. 
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humanitarian and development actors to talk has been challenging. The call for 
political will, shared objectives, and governance embraced through Resilience is a 
consequence of this background.  
The Seamless approach is an outlier in this sense, in as much as its focus on 
coordination is mainly on different levels of local actors rather than the donor or 
international level. This does not mean that other approaches have no consideration 
for them: they explicitly put more vulnerable people in the center and recognize local 
responsibility. Nonetheless, it is overall not clear to what extent other approaches 
include affected populations, not to mention actually conferring them ownership of 
the cooperation activities.  
 
3.3 Funding 
Funding is scarcely mentioned by the approaches listed, mainly because they address 
internal arrangements. It also follows that these approaches are not necessarily 
supported by new resources, but instead focus on improving the use of existing funds. 
The case is different for EU institutions since they actually have to deal with several 
pots of money, which are intended for different purposes. Something similar occurs in 
the Japanese system, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of 
humanitarian funding, while JICA uses mainly development funds. The dedicated 
report on LRRD and EU’s financing instruments by Morazan et al. (2012) discusses in 
detail the pros and cons of considering the need for new, transition-oriented pots of 
money versus adding flexibility to existing instruments, favoring the latter. However, 
in the case of Japan, the Seamless approach does not address the division of funds in 
any way.8   
8  According to Halperin and Michel (2000), out of all major donors only Japan and the EU 
do not implement all aid through a single organization. 
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It is worth observing that Early Recovery is one of the clusters receiving less 
support from donors, which is one of the reasons its emphasis has been transformed 
into crosscutting support to other clusters. This has certainly to do with the lack of 
understanding about what early recovery actually means, but also with the fact that in 
recovery different actors come into play, especially International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), which may see no need in channeling resources through the cluster 
system (OCHA et al. 2015, 37). IFIs promote and administrate their own donor pooled 
funds (Fengler et al. 2008), different from those OCHA uses for resource allocations 
during emergencies, which on principle are limited to funding life-saving activities 
and humanitarian needs. Nevertheless, such funds only represent a very small portion 
of all the resources—4.4% of the total humanitarian response in 2014 (Development 
Initiatives 2014), so the overall flow is far from clear, going from donors to agencies 
and NGOs directly, and not easily distinguishable through available statistics.  
 
4 The continuum in disasters triggered by natural hazards 
4.1 Phases and strategy 
The literature on disaster risk reduction (DRR) usually invokes the idea of a disaster 
management cycle (e.g., Carter 1991; Wisner and Adams 2002; Akaishi et al. 2013) 
(see Figure 2). Depending on the author, it may contain three, four, or five 
phases—i.e., mitigation and preparedness presented as different from prevention—but 
relief, recovery, and some form of prevention are always present. While there is less 
attention to relief, activities part of recovery generally include “the social sectors 
(housing, land and settlements, education, health, and nutrition); production sectors 
(employment and livelihoods, agriculture, commerce and trade, and industry); [and] 
infrastructure sectors (community infrastructure, water, sanitation and hygiene, 
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transport and telecommunications, and energy and electricity)” (GFDRR 2015, 17). 
Prevention linked to recovery encompasses “strengthen[ing] disaster preparedness for 
response, tak[ing] action in anticipation of events, integrat[ing] disaster risk 
reduction in response preparedness and ensur[ing] that capacities are in place for 
effective response and recovery at all levels.” (UN 2015a). Activities include 
structural and not-structural measures like construction codes, disaster-conscious 
reconstruction planning, risk assessments, risk governance, mitigation—for example 
through land use—, early warning systems, community DRR and other 
mitigation/preparedness measures (JICA 2015). From the prevention perspective, 
recovery is seen as an opportunity to build back better (BBB).  
 
Figure 2. A three-dimensional model of the disaster management cycle 
 
Source: JICA 2015 
 
The cycle is fundamentally a linear representation of the process that may not 
reflect the way situations work in the field. But, while the cycle has been contested by 
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some (e.g., Neal 1997), it remains the basic understanding underlying DRR. This is 
probably an unforeseen consequence of the way the international DRR system came 
to existence. From the outset, the DRR movement has been inspired by the premise  
that “prevention is better than a cure,” and so it has heavily focused on how to avoid 
disasters before they strike, mainly by mainstreaming DRR as part of development. 
The consequence has been that adopted frameworks for action have little to say about 
relief and, until the last one in 2015, even recovery. The Yokohama strategy 
acknowledged the importance of the continuum, but quickly emphasized that 
“[n]otwithstanding the full continuum, disaster prevention is better” (IDNDR 1994, 
10). In Hyogo (UN 2005) preparedness was included as one of five priorities, and 
recovery was acknowledged as a “window of opportunity,” but the emphasis remained 
on risk reduction. The Indian Ocean Tsunami was a turning point because it was the 
first time in history that there was enough money for cooperation to look well beyond 
relief on such a massive scale. Just in 2011 the first world reconstruction conference 
was held and the BBB mantra became a major trend inside DRR, giving way in 2015 
for one of four new priorities to be framed as: “Enhancing disaster preparedness for 
effective response and to Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction” (UN 2015a). In principle, the continuum is fully recognized through 
the outcome, but the framing suggests two things: the emergence of a strong recovery 
focus group inside the DRR community and the continuation of the traditional 
sidelining of relief, which did not manage to maintain its own standalone priority. In 
fact, crisis management as a whole has been carefully avoided, partly to underscore 
the importance and urgency of disaster risk management (UNISDR 2004; 2015).9   
 
9  It was suggested by an interviewee that structuring the framework for action around the 
disaster management cycle was resisted internally.  
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There is thus competition between phases in doing disaster management but 
the connection between those phases does not figure prominently in the major 
documents until recently. Since recovery became a field of active engagement, related 
work (Fengler et al. 2008; GFDRR 2015) recognizes the need to start working as soon 
as possible while relief is still ongoing, ideally building upon humanitarian work, but 
that is as far as the present framework goes. From the existing experience, there are 
two sectors that have been repeatedly shown to be the most critical in connecting 
relief with recovery: housing and livelihoods (Christoplos 2006; GFDRR 2015). 
Housing and livelihoods are not only critical but extremely complex, to the point that 
they are a big issue not only in developing countries but also in robust societies such 
as the Japanese (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014). There are multiple examples of work 
and guides on these two sectors such as the ones prepared by the International 
Recovery Platform, 10  but since any solution is due to be very contextual, 
generalization is difficult. Livelihoods and housing remain major issues in a coherent 
strategy for the continuum, for which bilateral assistance does not seem to have any 
comparative advantage, at least in principle, while UNDP (2013), ILO (2012), FAO 
(2013) and others have provided multiple inputs.  
Lastly, prevention in DRR is still framed as occurring prior to disasters, so 
how prevention and preparedness enter the picture of crisis management has not been 
addressed (Brusset et al. 2009). Once again, the rise of BBB has been a way of 
resolving this issue by linking prevention to recovery, but the approach does not 
necessarily cover the full range of prevention and, especially, preparedness activities. 
The interface, if any, between recovery and prevention phases/actors remains to be 
made clear with a better model of the continuum.  
10 See http://www.recoveryplatform.org/resources/guidance_notes_on_recovery 
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4.2 Actors and coordination 
The most significant characteristic of the realization of the continuum following 
natural disasters is the centrality of local communities and governments. While World 
Conferences on DRR gather a large number of diverse stakeholders at the global level, 
the process remains an inter-governmental one. Moreover, the model in terms of 
phases does facilitate local ownership since it is affected people and their 
governments who have to go through the full process.  
The way external actors come into the picture is mainly through assessment 
tools and plans derived from those assessments. This is most clear from the recovery 
framework, through which there is international agreement to use common tools, as 
for instance the EU, World Bank, and the UN post-disasters needs assessments 
(PDNA) (EC 2015, 109). National officers are supported in different degrees by 
international partners in order to produce the assessments, and then develop recovery 
plans that donors support depending on their capabilities. This process aims to avoid 
the risk of international agencies and development partners appropriating the control 
of the process (GFDRR 2015, 37). 
At the moment, similar mechanisms for relief dovetailed to DRR do not exist. 
OCHA, in conjunction with the national government, is in charge of coordinating 
emergency needs assessment based on national requests, which will inform the flash 
appeals for the clusters; yet, all agencies involved in humanitarian action undertake 
their own needs assessments. For example, OFDA has the DARTs (Disaster 
Assistance Response Team), and ECHO and JICA also deploy their own teams. The 
extent to which multiple needs assessments for relief can or cannot be coordinated is 
an issue heavily influenced by the flow of funding. From the UN perspective, some 
progress can be seen in the IASC (2015) admission that “adequate and not constrained 
government capacity” may result in working through national sectors, instead of 
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clusters. Since relief is followed by different forms of informal recovery that can 
interfere with future BBB plans, efforts at early coordination are very welcome.  
There is an important caveat to the relatively positive picture of the response 
to natural disasters. The international attention to the DRR process has been so far 
very unequal. During the two decades since 1991, Japan has contributed as much as 
68% of all the money to DRR (Kellet and Caravani 2013) and is the only country that 
addresses disasters both from its humanitarian and development branches in a very 
clear manner. For the rest of donors, activities related to disasters are mainly part of 
the humanitarian portfolio.  
 
4.3 Funding 
Funding issues in relation to disasters mostly address the lack of money for DRR. 
This is argued in relation to other types of crises: in 2010 figures, DRR amounted 
only to nearly 10% of what is spent on peacekeeping; lack of funding is also 
criticized as a share of the ODA, less than 1%, and as a share of humanitarian aid, 
6.4% in 2014 (Development Initiatives 2015; Kellett and Caravani 2013). This 
shortage of funding underlies the goal of mainstreaming DRR into development, 
although it is recognized that data is poor and tracking expenditures difficult. The low 
share of resources for humanitarian assistance also suggests limitations in addressing 
multiple parallel phases of the continuum through this budget line, in which relief 
needs override prevention needs. Funds for DRR, distinct from BBB, are not 
necessarily included in recovery plans if they are not explicitly there from the start. 
Since, apart from Japan, all bilateral assistance and donors provide DRR through 
humanitarian funding, it is not clear how the goal of preventing crises from repeating 
becomes part of the continuum in the long term. Besides, it is important to keep in 
mind that the biggest contribution of funds comes from citizens within the country 
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and abroad, largely during recovery but to a lesser extent during all the phases 
(GFDRR 2015, 42-43). 
The lack of a multilayered understanding of phases does contribute to tensions 
between relief and recovery actions. On the one hand, from the national government 
perspective, the ideal is to finish relief as soon as possible in order to provide people 
with some sense of normality, or at least progress. This requires careful assessment of 
the situation, since populations under stress and organizations supporting them could 
perceive this as a political decision. On the other hand, there is the perception that the 
humanitarian world “often stretches out the relief phase (immediate or delayed) until 
the funds earmarked for relief have been exhausted” (de Ville de Goyet 2008, 32). In 
other words, funding sources may be a source of conflict between implementing 
partners and local authorities, generating unfriendliness and reinforcing prejudices 
between actors. The issue is not, however, merely about funding because, as de Ville 
de Goyet (2008) recognizes, organizations receiving humanitarian funding do move 
into recovery projects as needs change on the ground: the International Federation of 
the Red Cross/Red Crescent is a conspicuous example, while Yoshikawa (2013) as 
well as interviews conducted as part of this review support the observation. Large 
enough organizations without mandate constraints can internally balance different 
funding sources feeding into their evolving programs. Still, it seems to be the case 
that humanitarian money is easier to get than development money (Buchanan-Smith 
and Maxwell 1994), creating perverse incentives to apply for available funds, which a 
strict humanitarian mandate tries to prevent, thus discouraging the goal of the 
continuum, by for instance banning the words permanent or reconstruction from flash 
appeals (de Ville de Goyet 2008, 33). 
It is important to observe that time-constrained allocations are not only an 
issue of relief. Support for the recovery process, as an extraordinary type of 
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assistance, can also be delimited by donors or local authorities to certain lapse of time 
that may or may not reflect the actual capacity of implementing actors to absorb 
resources on the ground. The rush to spend money does facilitate co-optation and 
waste. However, there is a trade-off between speed, quality, and control that can only 
be managed on a case-by-case basis (Akashi et al. 2013).  
 
5 The continuum after armed conflict crises 
5.1 Phases and strategy 
Peacebuilding has been developed mainly through the UN. The Report of the 
Secretary-General “An agenda for peace preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peace-keeping” (hereinafter referred as the Agenda for Peace) introduced in 1992 the 
idea of peacebuilding as one of the UN approaches to engage armed conflict, 
following preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Peacebuilding is 
described as a post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which will tend 
to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN 1992). 
Before peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy aims to avoid armed conflict altogether 
but, when conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and 
peace-keeping come into play. Once these have achieved and sustained their 
objectives, then cooperative work in peacebuilding dealing with underlying economic, 
social, cultural, and remaining humanitarian problems can take place. In terms of 
phases, the Agenda for Peace showed a fundamentally linear understanding of crisis 
management. 
Such a linear understanding was modified in the “Report of the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations” in 2000 (UN 2000). It redefined the four UN 
approaches to armed conflict to three: conflict prevention and peacemaking, 
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peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Different from the Agenda for Peace, the report 
avoided conceptualizing the approaches as linearly separate but emphasizes 
overlapping nature between them. The “United Nations peacekeeping operations: 
Principles and guideline” (called Capstone Doctrine) in 2008 reaffirmed this 
understanding describing how “the boundaries between conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become 
increasingly blurred” and how they rarely occur in a linear or sequential way but 
should be seen as mutually reinforcing (UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 18-19). As Figure 3 
from the Capstone Doctrine shows, the emphasis is on the way relevant actors 
including international financial institutions and other donors, UN agencies, and civil 
society organizations work together throughout all phases and share the same 
tasks—e.g. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. However, the Figure’s 
timeline of the three phases of transition—stabilization, peace consolidation, and 
long term recovery and development—still demonstrates a linear understanding 
(UNDPKO and DFS 2008).  
 
Figure 3. The core business of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping 
operations 
 
Source: UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 23. Timeline added by the authors. 
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Compared with the Capstone Doctrine, the “Report of the Advisory Group 
of Experts on the review of the peacebuilding architecture” (UN 2015b) did not 
limit the scope of peacebuilding to the post-conflict context. The review strongly 
emphasizes prevention of both lapses and relapses into conflict. It is based on a 
critical examination of the linear peacebuilding template starting from mediators 
achieving a peace agreement, followed by a limited transition period, a new 
constitution, and democratic elections. The review argues that this template 
resulted in fragmentation of efforts on the ground, where “there is little effective 
UN attention to prevention, great attention to crisis response...and again relatively 
little attention in the recovery and reconstruction phase” (UN 2015b, para.68). 
Based on that examination, the review calls for redefining peacebuilding as a 
broader, comprehensive approach encompassing pre-crisis activities through 
deployment and subsequent drawdown of peace operations and beyond post-conflict 
recovery and reconstruction. Such an understanding suggests more attention to the 
overlapping of phases; however, the review still focuses on the handover from 
peace operations to development actors.  
Despite this emphasis on the linkage between peace operations, development, 
and human rights, humanitarian relief activities appear outside of peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding seems the most over-arching strategy that encompasses all relevant 
phases and actors involved in the continuum challenge under the common aim of 
sustaining peace (UN 2015b). Yet, in practice phases and actors do not come together 
easily (e.g., Chandran et al. 2008; Boutellis 2013; Schulenburg 2014; UN 2015b, 
para.137). This can be evidenced in the proliferation of other strategies, some of 
which are included in Figure 1, such as transition, stabilization, and comprehensive 
approaches. These represent some complementarity, but also the distinct framing of 
the gray zone between peace and conflict. Underlying the proposition of these 
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concepts is the fact that contending principles and the operational requirements of 
different actors prevent the integration envisioned in the peace agenda (Eide et al. 
2005; Fraser and McNamara 2004).  
One particular deficiency of peacebuilding as a continuum strategy is the 
difficulty encompassing humanitarian actors. For example, Eide et al. (2005) pointed 
out how a humanitarian dilemma, especially focused on UN integrated missions, 
arose from the relationships between humanitarian, political, security and 
development actors. Humanitarian principles, especially neutrality, which make 
possible access to all conflict areas and communication with all actors in order to 
save lives, are incompatible with the political position of the UN and donors. This is 
because neutrality implies refraining from taking sides in hostilities or engaging at 
any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature, while 
the UN and donors need to rely on the internationally recognized transitional 
governments in order to push the process towards peace. Linking the phases of the 
continuum may be desirable, yet these two approaches to armed conflict crisis 
management—peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance—cannot easily overcome 
such dilemma and integrate relevant actors in one single strategy.  
 
5.2 Actors and coordination 
The multiplicity of approaches to armed conflict suggests the presence of a 
constellation of actors that find it difficult to work under a single roof. Besides the 
UN and its agencies, there are also the World Bank and regional development banks 
which fund development programs, and the International Committee of Red Cross 
(ICRC) and international NGOs which provide humanitarian and development 
assistance as final implementers. Bilateral donors are also involved as mediators, 
personnel providers for peace operations, funders to multilateral organization, and 
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implementers working parallel to bilateral assistance programs. 
Coordination appears to be the more critical issue for realizing the continuum 
in armed conflict crises. At the multilateral level, there have been discussions about 
coordination among humanitarian actors in the relief phase, including protracted 
relief, and between humanitarian actors and others in the UN system through 
Humanitarian Coordinator in UN integrated missions/UN Civil-Military Coordinator. 
Also, there are discussions within donor governments, such as the EU and US, about 
whether they should link humanitarian assistance and development, security, foreign, 
and economic policies or not, due to concerns over humanitarian principles (Steets 
2009). Donors are not restricted by a single humanitarian or development mandate, 
but still they have independent humanitarian structures, such as ECHO and OFDA 
partly in order to maintain neutrality through distinct portfolios. Separate portfolios 
allow bilateral donors to provide humanitarian funding to multilateral agencies and 
NGOs, which avoids to a certain point raising the humanitarian dilemma.11 Those 
portfolios, however, increase the demand for coordination between implementing 
partners and even inside donor governments. 
Many donors have developed domestic strategies and coordination 
mechanisms as a solution for more effective and efficient humanitarian crisis 
management. The so-called whole of government approach (WGA), ideally develops 
cross-governmental structures for decision making, planning, coordination and 
funding under a single strategy; it has been put in practice in countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Demark, Sweden, and the UK (Patrick and Brown 2007; Below 
and Belzile 2013; Bennett 2015; Faure 2015). While the efficiency and effectiveness 
of humanitarian crisis management are important motivations, accountability and 
11 How acute the dilemma is also depends on donors’ behavior. For instance, Steets observed 
that OFDA is more pragmatic and the European Union more principled (Steets 2009, 21-22); 
this also affects partnerships so, to give another example, Oxfam accepts funding from OFDA 
but not from USAID.  
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value for money also play an important role in WGA (Bennett 2015, 11). WGA also 
follows from the awareness that treating humanitarian assistance as an independent 
policy area has limitations in both capabilities and funding, encouraging some donors 
to “integrate humanitarian and development responses and bridge aid, security and 
peacebuilding” (Bennett 2015, 14).  
On paper, WGA implies a long-term perspective of development and 
prevention embedded in their response, although the cross-governmental decision 
making in the capital has yet to translate well into the field (Bennett 2015). The most 
advanced form of WGA is the UK’s Stabilization Unit. Under “the Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy”, DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) jointly work to provide expert staff at short notice and 
support interdepartmental analysis and planning for practical implementation on 
armed conflict and stabilization (DFID et al. 2011). As Rotmann and Steinacker (2014, 
16) pointed out, the Stabilization Unit is designed to link activities for pre-crisis 
prevention, response, and recovery in order to build structural stability; still, 
Rotmann and Steinacker sustain that this objective remains far from realized in the 
field operation. Other examples of WGA are the Danish Whole of Government Board 
and the Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), while the 
Australian government is now developing a new humanitarian strategy able to 
combine preparedness, relief, and recovery together under the newly formed 
Department of Foreign Assistance and Trade (DFAT). 
 
5.3 Funding 
Funding issues in armed conflict crises are the most visible in regard to the 
segmentation of the aid architecture from the macro perspective, as well as in regard 
to the prioritization of peacebuilding sectors from the micro perspective. There is a 
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great imbalance between allocations available for peacebuilding and the global 
funding either for humanitarian response or for peacekeeping operations (UN 2015b; 
OECD 2010). OECD analysis of aid flows in 2010 demonstrates that donors provide 
substantial financial support to post-conflict countries and that the resources are 
drawn from different budget lines—humanitarian, development and defense. Due to 
the segmentation of such aid architecture, including the separation of ODA and non--
ODA funding, and the different mandates and remits of aid instruments and agencies, 
critical activities in the early peacebuilding period may go unfunded (OECD 2010).  
From the micro perspective, ODA spending on “conflict, peace and security” 
is relatively small, only 2.5% of total ODA (Development Initiatives 2015). Funding 
for some activities like governance, demobilization of former soldiers, and security 
sector reform remain a challenge for donors, 12  while funding for traditional 
development sectors such as health, education, infrastructure, and agriculture receive 
most of the donor attention. Activities in early peacebuilding receive much less 
funding than humanitarian or development activities, mainly because of the 
limitations of the different instruments available during the period and a lack of 
flexibility to shift funding between different instruments once donors have allocated  
money (OECD 2010). To address the issue, some donors has developed specific funds 
for transition activities, using pooled funds combining ODA and non-ODA financing, 
that offer a flexible response in crisis situations requiring a more holistic view of 
peacebuilding. There are several examples such as the UK’s Conflict, Stability and 
Security Fund, the Peace and Stability Fund of Denmark, the Instrument for Stability 
by EC, and Transitional Development Assistance (TDA) by the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).  
12 The Group of Seven Plus initiative, a lobby group of self-acknowledged fragile states, has 
advocated five key sectors of priority peacebuilding intervention such as legitimate politics, 
security, justice, economic foundations and revenue and services.  
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6 The continuum after humanitarian crises reconsidered 
The aim of providing more than relief is common to all the approaches to the 
continuum throughout humanitarian crisis management reviewed in this paper. All 
approaches hint at the need for recovery and include some concern about prevention. 
They also attempt to involve a constellation of actors involved in managing crisis, 
although the actual reach varies considerably. Natural disasters appear to present the 
less demanding setting for realizing the continuum, while underlying dilemmas seem 
radically different for armed conflict. The former emphasis on phases contrasts with 
the salience of actors in the latter. The general approach, reflecting mostly 
humanitarian concerns, appears sidelined through both of the crisis-specific 
frames—especially in armed conflicts phases called “humanitarian” or “emergency,” 
which are almost the same as relief. In order to explore in more depth the implications 
of these differences, in this last section we suggest principles for a model for 
convergence through crisis management, and describe its limitations.  
 
6.1 A model for convergence in humanitarian crisis management 
The most basic depiction of the continuum was a linear movement between phases 
and/or between actors. Some presentations included only relief and development, for 
which there was total correlation between phases and traditional actors. The 
assumption of such a linear model between actors is that the main problem consists in 
the handover from one to the other. Another underlying assumption is that 
humanitarian and development are well-defined, static identities of actors. This may 
apply, and only to a limited extent, to those actors with strict mandates such as OCHA, 
UNDP, UNHCR, OFDA, or ECHO, but it seems to be less important for the rest of the 
actors, particularly for most of the NGO implementers, bilateral assistance in general 
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(Yoshikawa 2013) and, perhaps more importantly, for local actors (OCHA and DARA 
2014).  
The linear model becomes a little bit more complex when there are more than 
two phases. The gray zone in the middle has received multiple names, with recovery 
becoming a standard term for the Cluster System and natural disasters at least. The 
gray zone implies that for crisis management the traditional division of actors is not 
enough, requiring either some expansion of their work and/or the help of new actors. 
This seems to be a key problem in realizing the continuum. But does it suggest 
favoring actors or phases?   
General and peacebuilding approaches seem to favor a focus on actors 
traditionally connected with their mandates or division of labor. What is needed is the 
permanent commitment and joint-work of everyone during the entire crisis. A 
permanent overlap of actors-phases—i.e., all actors collaborating and all phases 
taking place at the same time—suggests that the very idea of a “phase” makes less 
temporal sense and, instead, each “phase” implies a set of actions with a common 
specific goal, which may converge during most of the crisis management without any 
predefined handover/sequencing.  
However, the idea of temporal phases cannot be completely dismissed. 
Temporal phases play a crucial signaling role for all actors since they convey the idea 
of progress. The idea of progress is the basic motivation of affected populations, local 
authorities, and even aid providers. By dismissing phases, the actor 
coordination-oriented understanding of the continuum accommodates external actors, 
particularly those with established humanitarian and development mandates, but at 
the cost of overlooking those actors without such constraints, beginning with the local 
government, which ideally should lead all the phases and not merely be treated as one 
actor among many. In other words, an actor-based conceptualization tends to become 
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an international coordination guide rather than a crisis management model.13 
Instead, a strategy-oriented understanding of the model seems, in principle, to 
facilitate the ownership of the full process by the local population. At least that is the 
case for national actors, from the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA 2011, 8) to the Philippine government (JICA 2015), with long experience and 
capabilities to confront crisis. Focusing on phases instead of actors is preferred to 
envision the continuum.  
The point about contiguity and joint work highlighted through coordination 
models is still valid and needs to be internalized. Indeed, it could be said that the 
importance and the challenge of continuum conceptualizations is to ensure that a 
framework based on phases does not interfere with multiple, non-linear processes that 
are ongoing in the affected areas. Different phases should be presented as layers that 
overlap for long periods, although they present different intensities as the crisis 
progresses (see Figure 4). Note that this multi-layered activities model combines 
sequencing and layering in so far as changes within the dominant phase can be seen as 
a sequence, but still for extended periods of time activities belonging to different 
phases overlap on the ground, addressing diverse, quickly-changing needs as the 
crisis evolves.  
We include prevention—including mitigation and preparedness—as a different 
phase demanding explicit attention, as in the case of natural disasters. However, 
contrary to the common practice, we suggest that prevention activities that are 
necessary after the crisis are the ones in need of recognition. For both armed conflicts 
and disasters, existing models introduce prevention mainly as a before-crisis activity, 
while the prevention that comes after is less clear. Observe how this imbalance on the 
sequencing of prevention did not encourage the DRR community to give attention to 
13 Morazan et al. (2012, 39) also point out the problem of an actor-driven model.  
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more specific approaches to recovery for long. Peacebuilding conflates recovery and 
the prevention of conflict re-emergence, but how the latter transcends peacebuilding 
is less clear. This is not to say that there are not currently prevention activities. DRR 
projects and multiple activities for the protection and promotion of human rights are 
well-known examples. But how they enter into the long-term continuum picture after 
a crisis has occurred is not usually considered. 
 




Yet, the inclusion of prevention against crises may further complicate the 
process because it confers a cyclical image to humanitarian crisis management. 
Phases can endlessly follow each other in as much as crises recur. The cyclical view 
of humanitarian crisis management is useful because it allows for putting the crisis at 
the center (Gomez 2014); however, the image of a cycle tends to exclude the 
possibility of progress beyond crisis that a model based on phases is supposed to 
contribute. This has resulted in three dimensional spiral models like the one used by 
the World Bank (2011) for armed conflict, or JICA and the government of the 
Philippines for natural hazards (JICA 2003, 2015). In order to simplify the 
presentation, we stick to a two-dimensional model.  
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6.2 Issues and limitations of the model 
The first problem with this rationalization is that the most basic division of phases 
may not be good enough to cover all types of crises. This is especially critical in 
armed conflicts, where not even relief is part of the peacebuilding agenda, and a 
different arrangement of armed and unarmed relief is preferred. Subsequent phases, 
a.k.a. the gray zone, remain disputed and multiple names have been given to whatever 
happens after the emergency peak subsides. Questioning the liberal peace model in 
particular attacks what are supposed to be the hallmarks of this process.  14 A general 
model of the continuum must thus allow for different configurations of phases to exist. 
Venturing even further, rather than general approaches to the continuum, an 
international cooperation system divided by types of crisis would make more sense, at 
least in as much as the full crisis process is of interest.  
Practice shows that for both phases and actors, independence and competition 
are seen as stronger driving forces, which is reinforced by funding arrangements 
(Weiss 2013). Funding seems to have been slow in reflecting the overlapping of 
phases, on the one hand, and how actors can actively bridge those phases in spite of 
budgetary constraints on the other.  
Matters of principle underlie funding arrangements undermining the 
realization of the continuum. In the case of armed conflicts, there has been strong 
resistance from the humanitarian sector against approaches resulting in some form of 
integrated action because the integrated continuum is seen as a threat to humanitarian 
neutrality. As a result, differentiated structures, even within donor organizations, 
were deemed necessary. Different pots of money were originally created not to 
overlap, and thus structurally the system started if not against the continuum, then 
14 The liberal peace model is a theory which sustains that democratization, the rule of law, 
human rights and the free market would result in peaceful and stable societies.  
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without it in mind. Additional difficulties inherent to UN-centric action have given 
way to a multiplicity of strategies at the periphery of the peace and security agenda. 
Several forms of transition funds have been suggested as a way to consolidate phases, 
though actor-specific approaches still seem more prominent. All in all, if phases are 
the way to go in order to realize the continuum, it would be necessary to align 
institutional arrangements and tools and mindsets for this end. 
Separate humanitarian and development budgets reinforce identities of actors; 
failing to find a relief phase inside the peace conceptualization demonstrates how the 
system favors actors over phases. This separation is rooted not only in multilateral 
institutions but also in donors, who theoretically have no single mandate but both 
through funding and operations sustain parallel systems. Nonetheless, in practice, 
several actors do move across phases and do their bit of the general continuum. 
Multi-mandate actors abound and put forward different strategies on the field, but 
somehow the policy dialogue is about humanitarian and development assistance. The 
multi-mandate approach does not mean that actors do not specialize on specific 
activities, as authors such as Smillie (1998) and White and Cliffe (2000) were 
skeptical about, but that the sectors in which they work are covered across phases. 
Such is the direction the Cluster System seems to be evolving towards, dovetailing 
with national sectors that should lead recovery and preventive development. Once 
again, the question that follows would be, in as far as the continuum is desirable, 
whether it is better to encourage the expansion of the present humanitarian 
coordination system and the strengthening of a humanitarian identity; or, if separate 




6.3 Localizing the the continuum 
Above all, perhaps the most important limiting factor to any conception of the 
continuum and its realization is local ownership. Christoplos (2006, 82-83) goes as 
far as to argue that the international community and individual agencies do not need 
any comprehensive master plan at all. Instead, they need “the vision, modesty and 
contextual awareness to understand how their efforts can best contribute to national 
and local recovery processes.” The GFDRR (2015) observes that during recovery 
most of the resources used are domestic. Even during relief, at least after disasters, 
locals are the ones who save most of the lives (Akashi et al. 2013). Despite good 
intentions and commitment, international assistance does not deserve the full blame, 
nor the full credit (Christoplos 2006). 
Nonetheless, the limitations of intervention from outside should not be 
understood as an invitation to focus exclusively on each organization’s continuum. In 
the worst case scenario, mighty actors may attempt to supplant locals in commanding 
the process, which is a recipe for failure. In the best case, achieving continuity of 
each external organization action would be meaningless in the midst of local disarray. 
This is, we believe, why assessments about continuum approaches always refer to a 
dismal picture. Contributions to specific components of the continuum are of course 
welcome, but they would not shine without progress on the bigger picture. And that 
bigger picture is beyond what a single actor can do. Structural change in the 
international cooperation system may be of help; however, inertia in the global 
system is rather strong and, thus, we instead suggest empowering the local people and 
government. International assistance also needs to balance pressures on the visibility 
of aid and the competition for resources, which further undermine the importance of 
the continuum as a guide for the response to crisis.  
The disjunction between an enlarged humanitarian coordination system or 
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crisis-specific frameworks has no easy answer, and is not something this review can 
resolve. It is important to bear in mind that success in realizing the continuum would 
also depend on multiple factors that go beyond the headquarters’ perspective, the 
subject of this review. Some examples include national and international political will, 
unexpected events, the historical background, the field presence of the involved 
organizations, the choice of implementation partners, and implementation capacities. 
Therefore, discussions at the conceptual and policy levels should be supported by 
more evidence about what works in practice and how, about which EU’s resilience 
compendium offers an interesting model. Still, it is too soon to say whether support to 
the Resilience approach would actually be reflected in better results in relation to the 
continuum, particularly because the Resilience approach did not emphasis on any 
phases. Empowering locals all around the crisis management cycle is commendable, 
but it does not replace the management needs. Gradual improvements in both process 
and capabilities must be pursued to consolidate the global crisis management system 
the present world demands. 
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42 
要約  
 
1991 年の国連総会決議において「救援、復興および開発の連続的実施（以
下、コンティニュアム（ continuum）と呼ぶ）」の重要性が指摘されて以来、
人道危機への対応として、「救援（ relief）だけでは不十分」との認識は国
際社会で広く共有されている。しかし現実にはコンティニュアムの実現は
容易ではない。その原因の一つは、コンティニュアム概念の不明瞭さ、共
通理解の欠如にあると考えられる。本研究ではこの認識にもとづき、人道
支援分野で一般的に議論されてきたコンティニュアム概念を、自然災害に
関わる防災分野、暴力的紛争に関わる平和構築分野における同種概念と比
較し、それぞれの特徴、課題を整理した。  
その結果、これら三つのコンティニュアム概念には、危機対応に関わる
アクターを意識したものと推移するフェーズを意識したものの二つの考え
方が並列して存在していること、人道危機対応のプロセスは段階的に移行
するものではない（non-linear）という認識がアクターの活動に十分に反
映されていないこと、人道支援分野における概念には予防が明確に位置づ
けられていないこと等が明らかとなった。そこで本研究では、あらゆる危
機に共通するコンティニュアムの理念型として、全てのアクターを人道危
機対応のプロセスに内包する多層的活動モデル（multi-layered activities 
model）を提示した。その上で、このモデルの長所や短所についても検討
した。またコンティニュアムの実現には、アクター間・アクター内連携だ
けでは十分でなく、被災地・被災者を中心に据えることが最も重要である
ことが確認された。  
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